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2008年国际金融危机以来,各国达成并践行了以中央对手方机制为衍生品市场风险防控核心的金融改革共识,然此改革本质上非为对风险之消除,而是对风险之集中管理,如此即产生了风险防范目标与风险集中实践间的矛盾,中央对手方汇聚了大量风险,成为了衍生品市场之重大风险点。此矛盾的纾解之道,在于平衡中央对手方营利目的和安全目的以构筑优良之风险管理体系:对中央对手方之事前监管应引入激励相容之理念,以使其营利目的与安全目的相衡相容;同时,应通过设置道德风险防范下的事后处置措施,遏制中央对手方失败之不利影响,并使得市场激励不遭扭曲。
Since the international financial crisis in 2008, all countries have reached and implemented the consensus of financial reform that the central counterparty mechanism is the core of the derivatives market risk prevention and control. However, this reform essentially is not the elimination of risks but the centralized management of risks This created a contradiction between the risk prevention target and the practice of risk concentration. Central counterparties brought together a large number of risks and became a major risk point in the derivatives market. The solution to this paradox is to balance the profit-making purposes and the security objectives of the central counterparty in order to build an excellent risk management system: the concept of incentive compatibility should be introduced to the prior supervision of the CCP so that its profit-making purposes and security objectives In the meantime, the adverse impact of the failure of the central counterparty should be checked and the market incentives should not be distorted by setting ex post disposition measures under the moral hazard prevention.