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利率市场化促使银行必须重视贷款企业的运作信息的可信程度,它可以选择相信全部或部分。基于银行对供应链市场信息的采信程度,本文提供了一个利率市场化对供应链影响的极小极大鲁棒后悔模型,构建了银行参与的由供应商和零售商组成的二级供应链,对比分析了银行采用零售商提供的需求部分或者全部随机信息的利率最优策略,进而刻画了最优利率决策对供应链运营所造成的影响。研究表明,信息的采信程度对银行利率的制定和供应链整体运作有着非常显著的影响,而零售商(贷款企业)在供应链中具有最大动力激励银行采信全部运作信息。
The liberalization of interest rates urges banks to attach importance to the credibility of loan companies’ operating information. It can choose to believe in all or part of it. Based on the degree of bank’s confidence in the supply chain’s market information, this paper provides a model of minimum extreme robust regret affecting the interest rate marketization on the supply chain, and builds a secondary supply chain in which banks participate in a supply chain composed of suppliers and retailers. This paper compares and analyzes the optimal interest rate strategy that banks use to provide some or all of the random information needed by retailers, thus portraying the impact of optimal interest rate decision on supply chain operations. Research shows that the degree of information adoption has a very significant impact on the formulation of bank interest rates and the overall operation of the supply chain, while retailers (loan companies) have the greatest incentive in the supply chain to motivate banks to adopt all operational information.