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敌意收购在英国、美国、日本涌现时,都引发了剧烈的争议,而后促进了监管机制的发展与进化。在这一过程中,主要起到作用的是次级立法者。但是在这三个国家中,具体制定规则的次级立法者各不相同。原因在于各国法院在商事纠纷解决中的地位不同,以及各国关键利益集团(例如机构投资者)的力量有所不同。新兴市场的敌意收购目前还很少见,但是立法相对完备,可视为一种“预防性立法”。这些规则均运用全球最佳实践保护国内主要利益集团的利益。若要发生变革,最可行的方式是通过次级立法者之间的监管竞争。
Hostile takeovers in the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan emerged when they triggered a fierce controversy, and then promoted the development of regulatory mechanisms and evolution. In this process, the secondary legislator plays a major part. However, among the three countries, the sub-legislators that make specific rules vary. The reason is that courts in different countries have different positions in the settlement of commercial disputes and the power of key interest groups in different countries (such as institutional investors). Hostile takeovers in emerging markets are still rare, but legislation is relatively complete and can be viewed as a “preventive legislation.” These rules apply the best practices in the world to protect the interests of major domestic interest groups. The most viable way to change is through regulatory competition between secondary legislators.