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本文从煤电双方的博弈模型分析入手,从博弈的均衡战略组合中得出:电价上涨(联动机制)并不能从根本上解决煤电价格倒挂的矛盾,只有在修改博弈条件,即对政府对电力市场管制机制进行调整的前提下,使电企拒绝电煤涨价的战略具有威胁性,才能从根本上解决煤电矛盾。另外,本文也对煤电纵向一体化解决煤电矛盾进行了论述。
This paper starts from the analysis of the game model of both coal and electricity, and draws the conclusion from the equilibrium strategy of the game that rising electricity price (linkage mechanism) can not fundamentally solve the contradiction between upside-down coal prices. Only when the game conditions are modified, Under the premise of adjusting the control mechanism of the electricity market, the strategy of rejecting electricity price increases by electricity-consuming enterprises is threatening to solve the contradiction between coal and electricity fundamentally. In addition, this paper discusses the vertical integration of coal power to solve the contradiction between coal and electricity.