论文部分内容阅读
地方政府在追求经济利益的时候存在收益与成本的严重不对称结构,是中国房地产问题在制度上的症结所在。在现有制度框架中,要想避免这种现象的出现,中央政府要么以行政干预的方式进一步拧紧货币和土地控制,从而导致要素配置的进一步向中央集中,要么在维持现有控制尺度的情况下,以政治任免的压力为手段,将地方政府的行为约束在可以接受的范围内。前者是向计划经济复归,此路不通;后者则等同于一种无法预测的艺术,完全仰赖政治领导人驾驭复杂局势的能力甚至运气,因而也是一种无法稳定预期的非制度状态。中央政府目前对房地产的态度非常接近后面这种状况。
Local governments have a serious asymmetric structure of income and cost when pursuing economic interests and are the crux of the system in China’s real estate industry. In order to avoid this phenomenon in the existing institutional framework, the central government either tightens monetary and land control by means of administrative intervention, resulting in further concentration of factor allocation to the central government or maintaining the existing control measures Under the pressure of political appointment and removal as a means to constrain the behavior of local governments within acceptable range. The former is a return to the planned economy, and this is not a solution. The latter, like an unpredictable art, relies entirely on the ability and even luck of political leaders to master complicated situations. It is also a non-institutional state that can not be stabilized and expected. The central government’s current attitude towards real estate is very close to the back of this situation.