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本文讨论了在公共决策的信息管道设计中,制衡性原则能否有效地抵御外部利益游说冲击。对立性的利益集团通过对信息部门的利益俘获实现对公共信息披露的操纵,从而改变公共政策的走向。当社会中对立利益集团游说能力差别较大时,多元化的信息管道可以更有效地避免政策被利益集团俘获;在对立利益集团游说能力相当时,多元化的信息管道会导致过多的对立和信息操纵。此外,信息管道的多元化虽然会降低公共政策走向的偏离程度,但也可能会增加公共决策的信息损失。
This article discusses whether the principle of checks and balances can effectively resist the lobbying of external interests in the design of information pipeline for public decision-making. Opposition sex groups through the capture of the interests of the information sector to achieve the manipulation of public information disclosure, thereby changing the direction of public policy. When the differences in lobbying power of opposing interest groups in society are large, the diversified information pipeline can more effectively avoid the policy being captured by the interest groups. When the opposing groups have the same lobbying ability, diversified information channels can lead to too much opposition Information manipulation. In addition, while the diversification of information pipelines will reduce the deviation of public policy direction, it may also increase the information loss of public decision-making.