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本文考虑了在同时存在预算约束和负外部性时的最优拍卖机制,分别在外部性对称和非对称的假设下,得到了令卖方期望收入最大化的最优拍卖机制应当是一个收取进入费用的全付拍卖,但在外部性非对称时,卖方要对不同的竞标者收取不同的进入费用。本文还指出,在最优拍卖机制设计中,外部性的出现会提高预算约束对卖方期望收入的边际影响,而且,将对其他竞标者带来更严重外部性的竞标者会被收取更高的进入费用,而将要承担更严重负外部性的竞标者会更容易受到预算约束的限制。
In this paper, we consider the optimal auction mechanism when both the budget constraint and the negative externalities exist, and obtain the optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the seller’s expected income under the assumption of symmetry and asymmetry of externalities, respectively. Of full pay auction, but in the external asymmetry, the seller to different bidders to charge a different entry fee. This paper also points out that in the design of optimal auction mechanism, the emergence of externalities will increase the marginal impact of budget constraints on the seller¡¯s expected income, and bidders who will bring more serious externalities to other bidders will be charged higher Entry costs, while bidders who are going to assume a more severe negative externalities are more likely to be bounded by budget constraints.