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真正的二论背反本质上是模态间的(比如把运动还原为空间中静止的位置)。尽管所有二论背反都必然蕴含逻辑矛盾,但逻辑矛盾并不必然预设二论背反(悖论)。这句话的意思是说,逻辑本身有一个本体层次上的基础——正如从充足理由原则和排除二论背反原则的本质中所看到的那样——,因此只有在一种非还原论的本体论基础上才有意义。当内在批判的方法揭示了真正的二论背反时,在不同哲学立场间进行有意义的理智互动的通道就被打开了。要区分矛盾与二论背反,哲学家就必须思考一种非还原论的本体论的含义,比如避免一元论的立场。
The real second argument is essentially modal (eg, restoring motion to a stationary position in space). Although all two theories must contain logical contradictions, logical contradictions do not necessarily presuppose two theories (paradox). The implication of this sentence is that logic itself has an ontological basis - as seen in the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of excluding the second principle - and therefore only in a non-reductive Ontology on the basis of meaningful. When the inner critical approach reveals a true second theory, the path of meaningful intellectual interaction between philosophical positions is opened up. To distinguish contradiction from second argument, philosophers must think of the non-reductive ontological meanings, such as avoiding monist positions.