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市场竞争的日益激烈使诸多企业出现过度投资现象,成为社会关注的热点问题。本文从投融资关系出发,结合西方负债融资具有相机治理作用的经典理论和我国特殊制度环境,以我国沪深A股上市公司2010—2014年的数据为样本,实证研究了不同来源负债对企业投资规模的治理作用。结果发现:商业信用与企业投资规模显著负相关,对约束企业过度扩张投资规模有治理作用;而银行借款和公司债券与企业投资规模均呈现显著正相关关系,不能发挥约束企业过度投资的治理作用。
The increasingly fierce market competition has led to over-investment in many enterprises and has become a hot issue in the society. This paper, starting from the relationship between investment and financing, combined with Western classic theory of debt financing with camera governance and China’s special institutional environment, with the data of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as a sample, empirical study of different sources of debt to business investment The role of the scale of governance. The results show that commercial credit has a significant negative correlation with the scale of enterprise investment, which has a governing effect on constraining enterprises to over-scale the investment scale. However, there is a significant positive correlation between bank borrowings and corporate bonds and the scale of enterprise investment, and can not play a governing role in over-investment .