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沙普利、埃尔文.罗斯等学者的“G-S算法”阐述了如何在某些失灵的市场找到可以让市场参与者都能接受的匹配方案。罗斯则运用这种算法,精心设计了各项实验,通过实践验证这种算法的有效性,并取得了非凡的成就,成功地解决了许多市场当前尚未有效解决的问题。本文引用埃尔文.罗斯与罗伊德.沙普利的经典模型,通过“高校招生”模型说明稳定市场匹配能够实现资源的最优配置。引述沙普利的“联盟博弈”模型,对比帕累托最优的三项必要条件,简要拓展分析稳定匹配理论和市场设计实践与竞争均衡之间的联系,得出市场运行条件更趋于理想化的结论。
The “G-S Algorithm” by scholars such as Shapri, Irvine Rose and others shows how to find matching solutions that can be accepted by market participants in some failed markets. Rose used this algorithm to elaborate experiments and validate the effectiveness of this algorithm through practice. He made remarkable achievements and successfully solved many problems that the market has not effectively solved so far. This article quotes the classical model of Elvin Rose and Roy Rupp Sappli, and shows that the stable market match can achieve the optimal allocation of resources through the model of “college admissions”. By referring to Shapley In the idealized conclusion.