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本文以股权分置改革为背景,利用2004—2008年中国上市公司经验数据,从代理冲突和博弈的角度分析了利益相关者与股利政策之间的关系。研究表明,我国上市公司利益相关者各方在股利分配上存在政策博弈现象。博弈的结果表现为具有控股股东的公司比其他公司具有更高的现金股利支付率;具备再融资条件的公司比其他公司具有更高的现金股利支付率;第一大股东参与管理的程度越低,现金股利的支付率越高,但这一特征并不显著。同时,在股权分置改革后,我国上市公司存在少分现金股利的倾向。
Based on the split share structure reform, this paper analyzes the relationship between the stakeholders and dividend policy from the perspective of agency conflict and game using the empirical data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2008. The research shows that there exists a policy game phenomenon in the distribution of dividends among all parties involved in the listed companies in our country. The result of the game is that the controlling shareholder has a higher cash dividend payout ratio than other companies; the company with the refinancing conditions has a higher cash dividend payout ratio than other companies; the lower the participation of the largest shareholder in the management is , The higher the payment rate of cash dividends, but this characteristic is not significant. At the same time, after the split share structure reform, the listed companies in our country tend to have fewer cash dividends.