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本文从代理理论出发,考察了大型国有企业和私人控股的上市公司在公司治理上的不同,藉以说明所有制形式与公司治理效率之间的关系。本文的分析表明,公司治理效率是和股权文化、法制环境、信用体系、政府治理水平等公司治理环境密切相关的,公司治理环境是相对所有制形式来说更为重要的因素;公有制的公司治理效率并不必然比私有制的公司治理效率低下,两者都存在着难以解决的公司治理难题,营造良好的公司治理环境才是解决这些难题的关键。本文的分析框架对于我国的国有企业改革和公司治理改革具有一定的理论和实践意义。
From the perspective of agency theory, this paper examines the differences in corporate governance between large state-owned companies and privately-controlled listed companies to illustrate the relationship between ownership and corporate governance efficiency. The analysis of this paper shows that corporate governance efficiency is closely related to corporate governance environment such as equity culture, legal environment, credit system, and government governance level. Corporate governance environment is a more important factor in relation to the form of ownership; public-owned corporate governance efficiency It is not necessarily less efficient than privately owned corporate governance. Both of them have difficult corporate governance challenges. Creating a good corporate governance environment is the key to solving these problems. The analytical framework of this paper has certain theoretical and practical significance for the reform of state-owned enterprises and corporate governance in China.