论文部分内容阅读
近年来,我国碳排放权交易市场发展迅速,对于交易平台的定价结构设计成为研究焦点,借助机制设计中的双边市场理论对碳排放权交易平台的定价进行博弈分析,与交易平台利润最大化相比,通过福利经济学分析,对流动性的提供方进行补贴可以提高全社会的福利状况。原因主要是流动性的提供方对流动性需求方具有一定的网络外部性,在交易平台追求自身利润最大化的情况下,不足以把网络外部性包含在目标函数内,所以监管者有必要对流动性提供者的手续费进行限制。通过模型分析认为,在社会福利最大化情况下,流动性提供方的手续费小于零。在实际监管过程中,监管者只需要强制要求免除流动性提供方的手续费即可,这样可以在较少监管执行成本的条件下,提高整个社会福利。
In recent years, China’s carbon emissions trading market has developed rapidly, pricing structure for trading platform has become the focus of research, with the aid of bilateral market theory in mechanism design, the game of carbon emissions trading platform pricing game analysis, and the trading platform to maximize profit phase Than through the welfare economics analysis, liquidity providers to subsidize the welfare of the whole society can improve the situation. The main reason is that liquidity providers have certain network externalities to liquidity demand parties. When the trading platform pursues its own profit maximization, it is not enough to include network externalities in the objective function, so it is necessary for regulators to Liquidity provider fees are limited. According to the model analysis, under the condition of maximizing social welfare, the liquidity provider’s handling fee is less than zero. In the actual supervision process, the regulator only needs to forcibly remove the handling fee of the liquidity provider, which can increase the social welfare with less supervision of the implementation cost.