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本文研究由两个供应互补中间产品的上游子公司和一个组装生产最终产品的下游子公司组成的集团公司内部的转移价格问题.这里,其中一个上游子公司的原料在成本上具有规模经济,并且下游组装子公司面临的是一个价格敏感型的确定性需求.利用博弈论的方法,研究了各种不同的联盟结构下各个子公司和集团公司的利润.结果表明,在大联盟结构下,集团公司的利润是最高的.为了分配大联盟结构下集团公司总的利润,本文构造了特征函数具有超模性质的合作博弈,证明了Shapley值是在合作博弈的核中.最后基于Shapley值分配方法给出了集团公司内部的转移价格.
This paper investigates the problem of transfer prices within a group company consisting of two upstream subsidiaries that supply complementary intermediate products and one downstream subsidiary that assembles the final product where the raw material of one of the upstream subsidiaries is cost-effective and The downstream assembly subsidiary is faced with a price-sensitive and deterministic demand.Using game theory to study the profits of various subsidiaries and group companies under different alliance structures.The results show that under the alliance structure, In order to allocate the total profit of the group company under the coalition structure, this paper constructs a cooperative game with the supermodular character of the characteristic function and proves that the Shapley value is in the nucleus of the cooperative game.Finally, based on the Shapley value distribution method Gives the transfer price within the group company.