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对一个改进的无证书代理签名方案进行了安全性分析,指出了该改进方案对公钥替换攻击是脆弱的。详细给出了公钥替换攻击方法,即对任意选择的消息和授权书,敌手通过替换原始签名者和代理签名者的公钥来伪造该消息的代理签名。分析表明,该改进方案不满足无证书代理签名的安全性质。针对这种公钥替换攻击,提出了一个新的改进方案。
An analysis of the security of an improved certificateless proxy signature scheme shows that the improved scheme is vulnerable to public key replacement attacks. The method of public key replacement attack is given in detail. That is, for any message and power of attorney selected, the adversary falsifies the proxy signature of the message by replacing the public key of the original signer and the proxy signer. The analysis shows that this improved scheme does not satisfy the security nature of certificateless proxy signatures. Aiming at this kind of public key replacement attack, a new improved scheme is proposed.