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相对于NYSE而言,NASDAQ证券市场监管中,NASD与其监管机构的分离更加完全。在这种构架下,FINRA可以把全部的精力都放在监管上,并且不会由于顾及NASDAQ的利益而产生放松监管的情况。我国沪深交易所属于会员制交易所,由自律监管引致的利益冲突问题尚不突出。但是,为在尽可能小范围内控制因自律监管引致的内部利益冲突,NASD+FINRA模式仍对我们有所启示。为充分保障交易所纪律处分委员会的纪律处分决定权,确保纪律处分委员会相对于经营管理层的独立性,纪律处分委员会设置在理事会之下,并与上诉复核委员会有效衔接,其委员由理事会聘任而非总经理聘任;纪律处分委员会与上诉复核委员会的成员不交叉任职,保持相互隔离,从而形成初审与复核的层级性。
Compared to NYSE, NASDQ securities market regulation, NASD and its regulatory agencies more completely separated. Under this framework, FINRA can put all its energy into regulation and will not relax its supervision due to the interests of NASDAQ. China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges belong to the membership exchange, the conflict of interests caused by self-regulation is not yet outstanding. However, the NASD + FINRA model is still enlighten us to minimize internal conflicts of interest due to self-regulation. In order to fully guarantee the discretion of the Exchanges Disciplinary Board in disciplinary action and ensure the independence of the Disciplinary Boards from the management, the Disciplinary Boards are set up under the Board and effectively connected with the Appeal Review Board, Appointment instead of General Manager Appointment; disciplinary committees and members of the Appeal Review Board do not cross appointments, remain isolated from each other, resulting in a hierarchy of first instance and review.