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本章主要围绕三方面展开:第一,探究语义内在论阐释所可能采取的形式;第二,内在论能够提供何种依据,用以摒弃关于词义的指称性阐释;第三,针对内在论质疑,坚持词义指称性阐释的理论家将如何回应。作者提出阐明内在论立场的两条路径,一是使词汇概念足够精瘦;二是使词汇概念充分丰满。作者进而甄别了“词汇语义学”与“推论角色语义学”两种方法,并着力阐明最小语义学与组织词汇语义学不相矛盾;并且进一步为坚持最小论假设提供佐证。
This chapter mainly focuses on three aspects: first, probing into the possible forms of semantic internalization; secondly, what kind of evidence can be provided by intrinsic theory to abandon the allegory interpretation of meaning; thirdly, How theorists who insist on the semantic interpretation of the meanings will react. The author proposes two paths to clarify the position of internalism: one is to lean the concept of vocabulary; the other is to make the concept of vocabulary fully full. The author then distinguishes two methods, “lexical semantics” and “corollary character semantics”, and tries to clarify that the minimum semantics is not contradictory to the organizational lexical semantics, and further supports the persistence of the minimalist hypothesis.