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目标公司的会计信息质量是否影响到收购公司的绩效,一直都是一个值得探讨的问题,现今有两种假设理论,一是流动性假设理论,一是管理者代理假设理论,前者的理论中阐述目标公司的信息质量越高,需要支付公司所要支付的价格就会越高,并购后得到的绩效就会越差,后者理论中阐述,目标公司的会计信息质量高,收购公司的一些相关资料就会越准确,支付的价格就会随之升高,有利于去抑制自利,抑制自大管理者出现机会主义的并购行为,进而得到比较高的并购效益。本文简单说一下目标公司会计信息质量、产权性质与并购绩效。
Whether the quality of the accounting information of the target company affects the performance of the acquiring company has always been a question worth exploring. There are two hypothesis theories nowadays: one is the liquidity hypothesis theory; the other is the hypothesis theory of manager agency hypothesis; The higher the information quality of the target company, the higher the price that the payment company needs to pay will be, and the worse the performance will be obtained after the merger and acquisition. The latter theory states that the accounting information of the target company is of high quality and some relevant information of the acquired company It will be more accurate, the price will be paid to rise, is conducive to curbing self-interest, inhibit opportunistic mergers and acquisitions pride managers, and thus get a higher efficiency of mergers and acquisitions. This article briefly talk about the target company accounting information quality, property rights and mergers and acquisitions performance.