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20世纪中期开始,为了有效解决委托代理带来的股东与管理者之间的代理冲突,国内外学者将关注的焦点转向高管薪酬激励机制。随着我国资本市场的发展,我国上市企业年报于1998年开始披露高管的持股及年度薪酬信息,并于2006年开始发布相关试行办法,这标志着我国上市企业已逐步建立起业绩型薪酬机制,相关学者在这一领域的研究也越来越多。一、管理者薪酬激励的动因:
Since the middle of the 20th century, in order to effectively solve the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers brought about by principal-agent, domestic and foreign scholars have turned their attention to executive compensation incentive mechanism. With the development of China’s capital market, the annual report of China’s listed companies began to disclose the shareholding and annual salary information of senior executives in 1998 and released the relevant trial measures in 2006, which indicates that the listed companies in our country have gradually established the performance-based salary Mechanism, the relevant scholars in this field more and more research. First, the motivation of managers pay incentives: