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在信息不对称的市场条件下,企业高管与股东之间存在不同决策偏好,衍生出了两者之间的潜在博弈。同时,在当代企业中,会计信息深深影响着现在或潜在的投资人、贷款人对企业做出的投资和信贷,又为企业决策提供着可观、有用的数据和资料,其实际需求又反映着企业高管与股东对企业状态的不同期望,促成了高管与股东的另一种潜在博弈。两种博弈均衍生于由特殊地位决定的高管与股东在企业发展过程中产生的决策倾向分化。
Under market conditions with asymmetric information, different decision-making preferences exist between senior executives and shareholders, which leads to the potential game between the two. At the same time, accounting information in contemporary enterprises has a profound impact on the investment and credit made by current or potential investors and lenders in enterprises. It also provides substantial and useful data and information for business decisions. The actual demand reflects these The different expectations of corporate executives and shareholders about the status of a business have led to another potential game between executives and shareholders. Both games are derived from the differentiation of decision-making tendency of executives and shareholders in the process of enterprise development determined by special status.