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为了研究碳限额交易机制下碳交易价格对供应链碳排放的影响,我们引入了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,建立制造商处于领导地位的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了供应链分散决策模式和集中决策模式下碳交易价格对碳排放的影响.研究发现,无论是供应链分散决策模式还是集中决策模式,对于清洁型制造商和低减排成本中间型制造商,碳交易价格的上升会使制造商最优单位碳排放量减少;对于高减排成本中间型制造商,随着碳交易价格的上升,制造商最优单位碳排放量呈现先减少再增加最后再次减少的趋势;对于污染型制造商,随着碳交易价格的上升,制造商最优单位碳排放量呈现先增加后减少的趋势.但就最优单位碳排放量而言,集中决策模式下制造商最优单位碳排放量低于分散决策模式.
In order to study the impact of carbon trading price under the carbon allowance transaction mechanism on the supply chain carbon emissions, we introduced a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, established the Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer is in a leading position, and studied the dispersion of supply chain. The impact of carbon trading prices on carbon emissions under decision-making models and central decision-making models. The study found that, whether it is the decentralized decision-making model of supply chain or the centralized decision-making model, the carbon trading price for clean manufacturers and intermediate manufacturers with low abatement cost The increase will reduce the manufacturer’s optimal unit carbon emissions. For high-cost abatement intermediate manufacturers, as the carbon trading price increases, the manufacturer’s optimal unit carbon emissions will decrease first and then increase again. For polluting manufacturers, as the price of carbon trading increases, the optimal unit carbon emissions of manufacturers appear to increase first and then decrease. However, in terms of optimal unit carbon emissions, the manufacturer’s optimal unit in the centralized decision model Carbon emissions are lower than the decentralized decision-making model.