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文章简述了我国房地产调控政策的五个阶段,分析了房地产政策调控下中央政府、地方政府、金融机构、房地产开发商以及购房者的行为。利用联盟博弈理论构建了四种主体联盟博弈收益函数模型。通过对博弈主体和收益函数分析得出了我国房产调控政策效果不够明显主要原因在于地方政府、房地产开发商和金融机构会形成联盟来应对各种调控政策。因此,中央政府须选择最优管制联盟模式,加强政策调控力度,通过降低调控成本,降低房地产价格上涨给开发商和地方政府带来的收益来增加调控效果。
The article briefly describes the five stages of China’s real estate regulation and control policy, analyzes the behavior of the central government, local governments, financial institutions, real estate developers and home buyers under the regulation of real estate policies. Using the game theory of alliance, four kinds of game models of the game functions of the alliance are built. Through the analysis of the game main body and income function, the main reason why the effect of real estate regulation and control policy in our country is not obvious is that local governments, real estate developers and financial institutions will form an alliance to deal with various control policies. Therefore, the central government must select the optimal regulatory alliance model, strengthen the policy control efforts, and increase the regulatory effect by lowering the regulation and control costs and lowering the real estate prices to bring benefits to developers and local governments.