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为了破解我国在环境保护方面存在的“企业污染、群众受害、政府买单”的困局,文章在“谁使用谁付费、谁保护谁收益”原则的指导下提出由造成生态环境污染的企业向政府进行赔偿来修复受损的生态环境。基于生态资本的自我增殖和时间价值,在传统的“零净损失”的政策目标下提出一种新的生态赔偿的政策目标。通过静态贝叶斯博弈分析发现:由于双方存在信息不对称,企业对政府政策目标的不确定性改变了政府的效用函数,双方对自身利益最大化的追求将导致两者产生冲突。最后提出完善企业与政府之间的生态环境损害赔偿制度的建议。
In order to solve the dilemma of environmental protection in our country, “the pollution of the enterprises, the victims of the masses and the government pay”, the paper proposes that environmental pollution should be caused under the guidance of the principle of who charges, who protects the proceeds, Of the enterprises compensate the government to repair the damaged ecological environment. Based on the self-proliferation and time value of ecological capital, a new policy objective of ecological compensation is proposed under the traditional policy goal of “zero net loss”. Through the static Bayesian game analysis, it is found that due to the asymmetric information between the two parties, the uncertainty of the government’s policy toward the government changes the utility function of the government, and the pursuit of maximizing their own interests will lead to the conflict between the two. Finally, it puts forward suggestions on how to perfect the compensation system of ecological and environmental damage between enterprises and the government.