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基于2004-2014年A股上市公司的数据,本文研究了不同竞争程度下过度自信管理层的过度投资行为是否存在差异。实证研究发现,激烈的产品市场竞争促进了过度自信管理层的过度投资行为。结合产权制度的分析表明,在国有企业中,产品市场竞争对过度自信管理层过度投资行为的促进作用更为显著。结论表明,过度自信的管理层在产品市场竞争的压力下,更可能采取激进的投资策略,我国特殊的产权制度安排进一步损害了产品市场竞争的外部治理效应。
Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2014, this paper studies whether there is any difference in over-investment among overconfident management under different levels of competition. Empirical studies have found that fierce product market competition promotes over-investment by overconfident management. The analysis of the property rights system shows that in the state-owned enterprises, the product market competition plays a more significant role in promoting over-investment in over-confident management. The conclusion shows that overconfident management is more likely to adopt a radical investment strategy under the pressure of product market competition, and the special institutional arrangements of property rights in our country further undermine the external governance effect of product market competition.