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基于博弈论中的机制设计理论和线性供应函数均衡(LSFE)理论,设计了一种激励相容的线性供应函数激励显示机制。依据该机制,所有发电商的最优报价策略为呈报其真实的边际成本曲线;所有用户的最优报价策略为呈报其真实的边际效用曲线;而且参与者(发电商和用户)是否披露其真实的经济信息与输电约束及其他所有参与者的报价策略无关,即所有参与者披露其真实的经济信息为市场惟一的纳什均衡,且该均衡为占优战略均衡。从而,独立系统运行员(ISO)根据参与者的报价曲线实施经济调度,以实现电力资源的优化配置和社会福利的最大化。不仅从理论上论证了所提出的激励机制的合理性,而且以IEEE 3机9节点电力系统为例进一步验证了该机制在限制市场势力和提高电力系统运行效率方面的有效性。
Based on the theory of mechanism design and the theory of linear supply function equalization (LSFE) in game theory, an incentive-compatible linear supply function excitation display mechanism is designed. According to this mechanism, the optimal bidding strategy for all generators is to report their true marginal cost curve. The optimal bidding strategy for all users is to report their true marginal utility curve. And whether the participants (power suppliers and users) disclose their true The economic information is independent of transmission constraints and all other participants’ bidding strategies, that is, all participants disclose that their real economic information is the only Nash equilibrium in the market and the equilibrium is dominated by strategic equilibrium. As a result, Independent System Operators (ISO) implement economic dispatch based on participants’ quotes to optimize the allocation of power resources and maximize social benefits. Not only the rationality of the proposed incentive mechanism is demonstrated theoretically, but also the validity of the mechanism in limiting the market forces and improving the operation efficiency of the power system is further verified by taking the IEEE 3-bus 9-node power system as an example.