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基于委托代理理论中代理人风险规避与风险追逐假说,探讨经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平之间的影响机理和关系,考察股权激励对两者关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:经理管理防御程度越强,企业风险承担水平越低,说明经理人为了保持自身职位和个人利益最大化,表现出更多的风险规避行为;管理层股权激励程度与公司风险承担水平正相关;管理层股权激励对经理管理防御与企业风险承担水平的关系存在正向调节作用。股权激励能激励经理人选择更多风险承担行为。
Based on the hypothesis of agent risk aversion and risk chase in principal-agent theory, this paper explores the mechanism and relationship between managers’ management of defense and the level of corporate risk-taking and examines the regulatory role of equity incentive in the relationship between the two. The results show that the stronger the manager’s defense degree is, the lower the risk-bearing level of the enterprise is, indicating that the manager shows more risk aversion behavior in order to keep his position and personal interests maximized. The degree of management equity incentive and the level of the company’s risk-taking Positive correlation; management equity incentive has a positive effect on the relationship between managers’ management defense and the level of corporate risk-taking. Equity incentives can motivate managers to choose more risk-taking behaviors.