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以国际海运碳交易机制的实施为背景,在考虑船东对减排产品类型偏好具有差异的情况下,基于Hotelling模型,研究提供不同类型减排产品企业之间的竞争策略。通过分析Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈的均衡结果,得到船东对某类减排产品偏好的增加,会促进该类减排产品的价格上涨,市场份额扩大和收益增加。并且,在Stackelberg博弈中,主导企业获得较Nash博弈下更大的收益,而跟随企业的收益变化取决于船东减排偏好与减排产品成本之间的关系。
Taking the implementation of international shipping carbon trading mechanism as a background, taking into account the differences in shipowner preference for emission reduction products, this paper studies the competitive strategies for enterprises providing different types of emission reduction products based on the Hotelling model. By analyzing the equilibrium results of Nash game and Stackelberg game, the preference of ship owners for certain emission reduction products is obtained, which will promote the price increase, market share expansion and income increase of such emission reduction products. Moreover, in the Stackelberg game, the dominant firm gains more than the Nash game, and the profit change of the following firm depends on the relationship between the owner’s emission reduction preference and the emission reduction product cost.