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运用演化博弈理论,构建在政府政策扶持下,医药企业选择不同创新行为的博弈模型。研究表明,政府的支持能够降低医药企业创新的风险及不确定性,从而激发医药企业的创新意愿,改变其创新行为。随着政府创新扶持力度的增大,医药企业更趋于选择自主创新模式,更利于医药产业实现转型升级。
Using evolutionary game theory, we construct a game model that pharmaceutical enterprises choose different innovative behaviors with the support of government policies. Research shows that government support can reduce the risks and uncertainties of pharmaceutical companies in innovation, so as to stimulate pharmaceutical enterprises’ willingness to innovate and change their innovative behaviors. With the increase of government support for innovation, pharmaceutical companies tend to choose independent innovation mode, which is more conducive to the pharmaceutical industry to achieve the transformation and upgrading.