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本文以2005—2010年期间在沪深交易所上市的公司为样本,研究了CFO的薪酬与会计信息质量的关系。会计信息质量分别用应计利润和审计意见作为代理变量,OLS和Logistic模型的研究结果表明,CFO的薪酬与公司信息质量显著正相关。为了解决CFO薪酬的内生性问题,我们分别用CEO的薪酬以及由CFO薪酬决定模型产生的残差e-CFOpay替代CFO的薪酬,结果发现CEO的薪酬与公司的可操控应计水平正相关,表明CFO薪酬与会计信息质量的正相关关系不是由CEO薪酬导致的;ε-CFOpay替代CFO薪酬后回归的结果与CFO薪酬为自变量时的回归结果一致,并且已经控制了公司规模、财务杠杆、董事会构成、股权结构等公司治理变量,表明在我国上市公司中,确实存在专门为提高信息质量而设置的CFO薪酬激励约束机制,这种激励机制是公司自发的,而非监管部门强制推行下产生的,说明许多上市公司自身已经开始重视财务信息的质量了。
This paper takes the companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2005-2010 as a sample to study the relationship between the CFO’s remuneration and the quality of accounting information. The quality of accounting information, respectively, with accrued profits and audit opinion as a proxy variable, OLS and Logistic model results show that the CFO pay and corporate information quality was significantly positively correlated. In order to solve the endogeneity of the CFO remuneration, we replace the CFO’s remuneration with CEO’s remuneration and the residual e-CFOpay generated by the CFO’s remuneration decision model, respectively. The results show that CEO’s remuneration is positively correlated with the company’s manageable accrual level, The positive correlation between CFO remuneration and accounting information quality is not caused by CEO remuneration; the result of ε-CFOpay’s replacement of CFO remuneration is consistent with the regression result of CFO remuneration as independent variable and has controlled the company’s scale, financial leverage, Constitute, ownership structure and other corporate governance variables, indicating that in China’s listed companies, there is indeed specifically for improving the quality of information and the CFO compensation incentive and restraint mechanisms, this incentive mechanism is the company spontaneous, rather than the regulatory agencies forced to produce , Indicating that many listed companies themselves have begun to attach importance to the quality of financial information.