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在支援主攻部队作战时,空降部队能够通过突然、果敢的攻击行动快速夺取战略要点。然而,在阻击敌先遣部队时,这种战术却显得毫无价值。在敌重型装甲部队的正面实施空降或机降无异于自杀行为。但这并没有妨碍美军在1990年的“沙漠风暴”行动中以82空降师的一个旅与伊拉克的几个装甲师相抗衡。尽管有这种先例,但美军仍然没有组建和训练一支用来阻击敌大规模先遣部队的快速反应部队。 美军只有少数指挥官懂得后卫战术。实际上,他们在学校里并没有学过这种战术,训练中也很少演练“后退”这样的训练科目。这是很令人遗憾的,因为敌人的快速行进部队很容易遭受伏击。大多数指挥官在遭受损
While supporting the main force, the airborne forces were able to quickly capture strategic points through sudden and courageous attacks. However, this tactic was worthless when it came to deter the enemy advance troops. The implementation of an airlift or jet-landing at the front of an enemy heavy armored unit is nothing less than suicide. However, this did not prevent the U.S. military from contending with a few brigades of the 82 Airborne Division against several armored divisions in Iraq during the 1990 Desert Storm operation. Despite such precedents, the U.S. military still does not have the means to establish and train a rapid reaction force to block the enemy’s large-scale advance force. Only a few commanders in the U.S. Army know defender tactics. In fact, they did not learn this tactic at school, and training exercises like “Backward” were rarely drilled. This is very regrettable, because the enemy’s rapid marching force is vulnerable to ambushes. Most commanders are suffering