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本文从中国政府治理模式转型这一视角研究了参与式预算的改革动力。在中国当前实行垂直控制的政府治理结构下,本级政府只对上级政府负责,居民可以通过上访约束本级政府行为。面对群众上访带来的上级压力,本级政府可在加大民生类财政支出比重、加大维稳投入和实行参与式预算改革三种策略中选择。本文通过建立包括本级政府、居民和上级政府在内的博弈模型,从理论上说明居民上访成本的下降以及上级政府上访问责的加强会带来本级政府的最优治理模式从策略一转向策略二,进而向策略三转变。其内在机制在于:一方面,当上访成本很低时,本级政府仅依靠加大民生类财政支出很难使居民不再上访;另一方面,参与式预算改革有助于从源头上解决民生类支出不足的问题,进而减少上访,降低维稳费用,使居民和本级政府的福利同时上升成为可能。
This essay studies the motivation for the reform of participatory budgeting from the perspective of the transition of Chinese government governance. Under the current government control structure under the vertical control in China, the government at the corresponding level is only responsible for the higher level government and the residents can bind the government at the corresponding level through petitions. In the face of pressure from superiors brought by the petitions of the masses, the government at the corresponding level can choose among three tactics of increasing the proportion of public spending on livelihood, increasing investment in maintaining stability and implementing participatory budget reform. By establishing a game model including the government at the corresponding level, the residents and the higher level government, this paper theoretically shows that the decrease of resident petition costs and the increase of the accountability of upper level governments will lead the government at the optimal level to shift from a strategy Strategy two, and then to the strategy of three changes. On the one hand, when the cost of petitioning is very low, the government at the corresponding level can hardly stop the residents from petitioning only by increasing the financial expenditure of the people’s livelihood. On the other hand, participatory budget reform helps to solve the problem of people’s livelihood at the source The problem of insufficient expenditure of the class, thus reducing the petition, reducing maintenance costs, so that residents and the government at the same level of welfare as possible.