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为了合理地分配军事供应链系统实施供应商管理库存(Vendor Management Inventory,VMI)策略后所取得的收益,建立了传统模式、基于Stackelberg博弈和基于纳什均衡协商的收益共享协调模型来协调VMI,并进行了实例分析。结果表明:传统的VMI模型缺乏合理性和可操作性;Stackelberg博弈模型能使军供双方各自的收益有一定的提高,但供应链的整体收益不能最大化;纳什均衡协商模型不但能使军供双方各自的收益有所改善,实现双赢,而且还能使供应链整体收益达到帕累托最优。
In order to rationally allocate the revenue obtained after the implementation of Vendor Management Inventory (VMI) strategy in the military supply chain system, the traditional model is established, and the VMI is coordinated based on the Stackelberg game and the revenue sharing coordination model based on Nash equilibrium negotiation. An example analysis was carried out. The results show that the traditional VMI model lacks rationality and maneuverability. The Stackelberg game model can make the respective benefits for both parties increase to a certain extent, but the overall profit of the supply chain can not be maximized. The Nash equilibrium negotiation model can not only make the military supply The respective benefits of both parties have been improved and a win-win situation can be achieved, and the overall return to the supply chain can reach Pareto optimality.