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供应链关系中各个经济体与最终市场的接触程度不同,造成各级供应商之间关于市场需求信息的不对称。以S tacke lberg模型为基础,研究短生命周期产品二级供应链的协调问题。设计制造商占主导地位的供应链中基于价格折扣实现信息共享的协调机制。通过比较价格折扣机制协调下各方的收益,证明数量价格折扣不但能促使零售商传递信息,还可以提高供应链整体收益和满足市场需求。上述结论表明通过有效的价格折扣机制可以促进供应链协调、降低零售商市场风险和减少产品短缺现像,有利于整个社会福利的提高。
Each economy in the supply chain has different degrees of contact with the final market, resulting in asymmetric information about market demand among suppliers at all levels. Based on the S tacke lberg model, we study the coordination of the secondary supply chain of short life cycle products. Design manufacturers dominate the supply chain based on price discounts to achieve information sharing coordination mechanism. By comparing the benefits of the parties under the price discount mechanism, it is proved that the quantitative price discount can not only promote the retailer to transmit information, but also improve the overall profit of the supply chain and meet the market demand. The above conclusion shows that the effective price discount mechanism can promote supply chain coordination, reduce retailer market risk and reduce the phenomenon of product shortage, which is beneficial to the improvement of social welfare as a whole.