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本文旨在设计激励相容的最优失业保险合同,以解决因信息不对称引发的“道德风险”和“逆向选择”问题。针对工作搜寻中的“道德风险”问题,最优动态合同让失业者获得的失业保险金随失业期延长而递减,其再就业后的失业保险税随失业期的延长而递增。针对强制保险中出现的“逆向选择”或“交叉补贴”问题,本文设计了自我选择的合同,把不同类型失业者区分开,避免了不同类型的失业者冒充或补贴其他类型失业者。在此基础上,本文对完善现行失业保险制度提出了政策建议。
The purpose of this paper is to design incentive-compatible optimal Unemployment Insurance contracts to solve the problems of “moral hazard” and “adverse selection” caused by information asymmetry. In order to solve the problem of “moral hazard” in job search, the optimal dynamic contract reduces the unemployment insurance benefit for the unemployed as the unemployment period increases, and the unemployment insurance tax after reemployment increases with the increase of the unemployment period. In view of the problem of “adverse selection” or “cross subsidy” in compulsory insurance, this paper designs a self-selected contract to distinguish different types of unemployed persons and to prevent different types of unemployed persons from posing or subsidizing other types of unemployment By. On this basis, this article puts forward policy suggestions on improving the existing unemployment insurance system.