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农民联保贷款是解决农村增信方式不足与农业生产资金缺乏矛盾的有效途径,是经济新常态背景下深化农村金融改革的重要方向。文章以博弈理论为研究基础,以农村联保贷款的参与方为研究对象,重点探究其博弈关系及其对农信社联保贷款模式的影响,研究结果显示:由于信息不对称,农民间由于风险类型不一致难以形成联保小组,农户风险类型一致是形成联保小组的基础;联保小组风险一致的情况下,由于信用体系尚未形成与不对称性的存在,农户的最优策略是不还款策略,农信社的最优策略是不发放贷款,联保贷款关系难以形成。在此背景下,完善贷款机制设计、构建社会信用体系、强化贷款惩罚力度是完善联保贷款的有效模式。
Peasants UNPROFOR loans are an effective way to solve the problem of lack of trustworthiness in rural areas and lack of funds for agricultural production and an important direction for deepening rural financial reform in the context of the new normal economy. The article takes the game theory as the research foundation, participates the participants of the rural UNPROFOR loan as the research object, focuses on its game relationship and its impact on the rural credit cooperatives secured loan mode. The result shows that due to the information asymmetry, Unconformity of risk types makes it difficult to form a contingent group, and the same risk type of farmers is the basis for forming a contingent group; under the circumstance that the UNPROFOR team has the same risk, because the credit system has not yet formed and the asymmetry exists, the best strategy for farmers is not to return Section strategy, the optimal strategy of rural credit cooperatives is not to issue loans, UNPROFOR loan relationship is difficult to form. Under this background, it is an effective mode to perfect the loan of UNPROFH after improving the design of loan mechanism, constructing social credit system and strengthening the punishment of loan.