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企业“内部人控制”问题是由美籍日本经济学家青木昌彦在1994年首先提出来的,是指企业中独立于所有者(外部人)的经营者(内部人)掌握着企业的实际控制权,在公司经营中充分体现自身利益,侵蚀所有者的权益,实现自身利益最大化,其实质是内部人利用公共权利寻租而侵占所有者资产。大量研究表明.内部人控制的实质是现代企业所有权与经营权相分离的情况下,委托人(所有者)和代理人(经营者)的利益取向不一致、信息不对称而导致的道德风险、企业契约不完备性引起的激励不相容等引致的必然结果,其主要是来研究转轨经济中公司治理结构问
The issue of firm “insider control ” was first raised by American Japanese economist Aoki Masahiko in 1994 referring to the fact that the managers (insiders) of firms that are independent of the owners (outsiders) The actual control rights fully reflect their own interests in the operation of the company, erode the rights and interests of the owners and maximize their own interests. The essence is that insiders use the public rights to seek rent and occupy the owner's assets. Numerous researches show that the essence of insider control is the moral risk caused by inconsistent interest orientation and information asymmetry between principal (owner) and agent (manager) under the condition that the ownership and management of modern enterprise are separated from each other, Contract inevitability caused by the incompatibility of incentives caused by the inevitable result of its main is to study the transitional economy in the corporate governance structure