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本文旨在捍卫当代认识论当中关于可错主义(fallibilism)的认知观念,通过对该观念的合理解读,笔者希望能够指出:所谓的可错主义“困惑”是可以被成功地解释和说明的。换言之,关于可错主义的认知观念并没有受到实质的挑战。为了达成这一目的,本文分为三个主要部分:第一部分首先介绍了关于可错主义认知观念的表述形式,对其中的一些核心概念作出了基本的解释说明;在第二部分中,笔者主要介绍了相关学者对可错主义认知概念的批评,尤其着重强调了所谓的关于可错主义的困惑。在第三部分中,通过借助P.格赖斯的语用理论,笔者解释了所谓的关于可错主义“困惑”产生的根源,从而捍卫了可错主义的认知观念。
The purpose of this article is to defend the contemporary epistemology of the cognitive concept of fallibilism. Through a reasonable interpretation of this concept, the author hopes to point out that so-called erroneous “confusion” can be successfully explained and explained of. In other words, there is no real challenge to the erroneous notion of cognition. In order to achieve this goal, this article is divided into three main parts: The first part introduces the expression of the concept of erroneous cognition, and gives a basic explanation of some of the core concepts. In the second part, It mainly introduces the related scholars’ critique of the concept of erroneous cognition, especially emphasizing the so-called confusion about erroneous doctrine. In the third part, through the pragmatic theory of P. Grice, the author explains the so-called root cause of the erroneous “puzzled ”, thereby defending the erroneous cognitive concept.