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现代公司法律制度的核心就是由所有者的代理人来管理经营的制度,即代理制度。所有权与经营权的分离,可以充分利用公司形式筹集资金,利用董事、经理的经营决策能力;与此同时,因为所有权与经营权的分离,代理人腐败等一系列负面影响也随之产生。为了约束公司代理人的行为,美国公司法对董事、经理及高级管理人员都规定了包括注意义务和忠诚义务在内的严格的义务。本文以美国律师协会起草的《示范公司法》为各州公司立法的代表,结合一些著名的判例,阐述美国关于公司董事注意义务的理论和实践。
The core of the modern corporate legal system is that the owner’s agent to manage the business system, that is, the agency system. The separation of ownership and management rights can make full use of the corporate form to raise funds and make use of the management decision-making ability of directors and managers. At the same time, a series of negative influences such as the corruption of agents arise due to the separation of ownership and management rights. In order to restrain the acts of the company’s agents, U.S. company law provides strict obligations to directors, managers and senior management, including duty of care and loyalty. In this article, the “Model Corporation Law” drawn up by the American Bar Association is a representative of the legislature of state companies, combining some well-known jurisprudence to expound the theory and practice of American directors’ duty of care.