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考虑到很多门限签名方案都不抵抗恶意PKG攻击的事实,本文提出了一个无可信中心下基于身份的门限签名方案,避免了该类型攻击.在该方案中,每一个签名参与者都可以验证公钥和公钥份额的合法性,从而避免了公钥份额替换攻击.给出了无可信中心下基于身份的门限签名方案不可伪造性的安全模型,并利用此安全模型给出了该方案在标准模型下的安全性证明.
Considering the fact that many threshold signature schemes do not resist the malicious PKG attacks, this paper proposes an identity-based threshold-based signature scheme without trusted cores, which avoids this type of attack. In this scheme, each signature participant can verify The validity of the public key and the public key share so as to avoid the replacement of the public key share.The security model of the unforgeability of identity-based threshold signature scheme without a trusted center is given and the security model is given by using the security model Proof of safety under the standard model.