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随着家族控股上市公司的激增,控股股东和中小股东之间的利害冲突问题越来越引起人们的关注。冲突的根本原因是家族企业金字塔形所有权结构导致控制权和现金流权的分离。换句话说,家族控股股东能利用较小的现金流权来实现较大的控制权,这就给公司治理①造成了外部性问题。本文运用外部性理论分析了家族企业的内部治理问题,并通过对日本和韩国财阀治理结构改革的比较,提出了关于中国家族企业治理改革的建议。
With the proliferation of family-controlled listed companies, interest conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders have drawn more and more attention. The root cause of the conflict is the pyramidal ownership structure of the family business leading to the separation of control and cash flow rights. In other words, the controlling shareholder of the family can use smaller cash flow rights to achieve greater control, which creates externalities for corporate governance. This paper analyzes the internal governance of family-owned enterprises by using the theory of externality, and puts forward some suggestions on the reform of governance of family-owned enterprises in China through the comparison of the reform of the governance structure of the country’s treasuries.