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本文以可供出售金融资产处置为例,实证检验了管理层择时处置可供出售金融资产的动机以及可供出售金融资产处置收益对高管薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,公允价值计量诱发了管理层的私利动机和机会主义行为,管理层通过择时处置可供出售金融资产以达到避免业绩下滑的目的;业绩下滑越严重,可供出售金融资产处置收益越高;同时,管理层从可供出售金融资产处置收益中获得了薪酬激励,尤其在业绩下滑的公司,高管薪酬对可供出售金融资产处置收益的敏感系数显著大于对其他盈余项目的敏感系数。本研究从契约有用性视角揭示了公允价值计量的经济后果,研究结果有助于强化对上市公司机会主义会计行为的监管,改善薪酬契约这一公司治理机制的有效性。
This paper takes the disposal of available-for-sale financial assets as an example to test empirically the management’s incentive to dispose of available-for-sale financial assets and the impact of the disposal of available-for-sale financial assets on executive compensation contracts. The study finds that the fair value measurement induces management’s private motivation and opportunistic behavior, and the management achieves the purpose of avoiding performance decline by disposing available-for-sale financial assets by timing; the more serious the performance decline, the more the proceeds of sale of financial assets available for sale In the meantime, management received salary incentive from the disposal of available-for-sale financial assets. Especially in the decline of performance, the sensitivity of executive compensation to the disposal of available-for-sale financial assets is significantly greater than the sensitivity to other surplus items . This study reveals the economic consequences of fair value measurement from the perspective of contractual usefulness. The research results help to strengthen the supervision of opportunistic accounting behavior of listed companies and improve the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism of remuneration contract.