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本文以2003—2013年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,研究晋升激励是否影响企业风险承担水平,同时,考虑不同产权下的职位晋升对风险承担的激励效应差异。研究结果表明:(1)晋升激励能够提高风险承担水平,但这一激励效应仅存在于民营企业当中,国有企业的晋升激励对风险承担没有显著性影响;(2)对于风险承担,股权激励、薪酬激励均不能对其产生显著性影响,只有晋升激励具有有效性;(3)当国有企业民营化时,晋升激励仍然能够提高企业风险承担水平;(4)央企的风险承担水平要比地方国有企业高。本文丰富了晋升激励研究,同时,对于当前国有企业改革具有一定的现实意义。
This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013 as a sample to study whether the promotion incentive affects the level of corporate risk-taking and at the same time considers the incentive effects of job promotion under different property rights to risk-taking. The results show that: (1) promotion incentive can increase the level of risk-taking, but this incentive effect exists only in private enterprises, promotion incentives of state-owned enterprises have no significant impact on risk commitment; (2) for risk taking, equity incentive, (3) When the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the promotion of incentives can still raise the level of corporate risk-taking; (4) the level of risk-taking central enterprises than local state-owned High business. This article enriches the study of promotion and incentive, meanwhile, it has some practical significance for the current reform of state-owned enterprises.