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我在别处曾论证,王阳明的良知即道德知识既不是莱尔(Gilbert Ryle)的理智之知(knowing-that),也不是其能力之知(knowing-how),而是一种为他所忽略了的动力之知(knowing-to),即驱使其拥有者做出相应行动的知识。由于王阳明认为每个人都生而就有这样的良知,这就产生了一个问题:为什么有人不做道德的事情甚至反而去做恶的事情呢。许多学者认为王阳明没有真正解决宋明儒学所遇到的这个恶的问题。与此相反,我认为,王阳明对此提供了一个成功的、令人信服的说明。有人作恶,是因为其私欲将其良知遮蔽了,这就好像乌云可以将阳光遮蔽一样;而私欲之产生则是由不良的习气使然。王阳明这里所谓的习气,一方面是指一个人出生和成长于其中的环境;而另一方面则指一个人生来就有的气质。这两个方面相应于罗尔斯(John Rawls)的影响一个人在其社会中的地位的社会偶然性和自然偶然性。由于具有什么样的习气不是一个人可以自己控制的,而恰恰这样的习气又会影响一个人的道德品质,我们也可以用威廉斯(Bernard Williams)和纳格尔(Thomas Nagel)的道德运气概念来说明。但是,威廉斯认为,道德运气是一种矛盾修辞法:道德涉及的是人所能控制的事情,而运气恰恰是人所不能控制的事情。纳格尔也说道德运气是一种悖论,因为他隐含了这样一个说法:一个人不应当(因为是运气)为他应当(因为是道德)负责的事情负责。尽管如此,他们都认为我们还是可以要求人们为其所做的事负责,尽管他们做这样的事是由于他们无法控制的运气造成的,因为不然我们就没有办法让任何人为其做的任何事负责。在本文中,我将用王阳明对恶的说明来挑战这样一种道德运气观。就其习气是我们无法控制的东西而又影响我们的道德品质而言,王阳明确实也有一个道德运气概念。但王阳明的道德运气观有两个明显的特征,使之不再是一种矛盾修辞或者悖论。一方面,不好的习气之所以会影响一个人的道德质量,很重要的一个因素是其志不立,而一个人的志之立与不立则完全是一个人可以控制的;另一方面,虽然王阳明理论上也承认有可能出现生而知之的圣人,但他强调的、认为一个人的可贵之处不是其无过,而是其能改过。
I have argued elsewhere that Wang Yangming’s conscience, or moral knowledge, is neither Gilbert Ryle’s knowing-that nor its knowing-how, but a neglect of him Knowing-to, the knowledge that drives its owner to act accordingly. Since Wang Yangming believes that everyone is born with such conscience, this raises the question of why some people do not do moral things or even do evil things. Many scholars think that Wang Yangming did not really solve the evil problem encountered by Confucianism in Song and Ming Dynasties. In contrast, I think Wang Yangming provided a successful and convincing account of this. Some people do evil because their desires keep their consciences out of sight, as if dark clouds can cover the sun; and the generation of desires is made by bad habits. Wang Yangming here called habit, on the one hand refers to a person born and grew up in which the environment; the other hand, refers to a person born temperament. These two aspects correspond to the social contingencies and natural contingencies of John Rawls that affect one’s position in his society. Because what kind of habit is not controlled by oneself, and just such habit can affect one’s moral character, we can also use the moral luck concept of Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel To illustrate. However, Williams believes that moral luck is a paradoxical rhetoric: morality involves things that one can control, and luck is precisely what one can not control. Nagel also said moral luck is a paradox because he implies an argument that one should not (because of luck) be responsible for what he should (because of morality) be responsible for. Still, they all think we can still ask people to be responsible for what they do, even though they do it because of their uncontrollable luck, because otherwise we have no way to hold anyone accountable for what they do . In this article, I will challenge such a view of moral luck with Wang Yangming’s account of evil. As far as his habits are beyond our control and affect our moral character, Wang Yangming indeed has a concept of moral luck. However, Wang Yangming’s concept of moral luck has two obvious characteristics, so that it is no longer a paradoxical rhetoric or paradox. On the one hand, bad habits affect one’s moral quality. One of the most important factors is that one can not control his or her own selfishness. One’s control of one’s self and independence is entirely controlled by one person. On the other hand, Although Wang Yangming also theoretically acknowledged the possibility of a born saint, he emphasized that one’s worth is not its absence, but its ability to change.