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自然状态下小农水管护场域的进化博弈结果是农民陷入“搭便车”的囚徒困境之中。制度嵌入会使农民选择“搭便车”策略的得益减少、选择参与管护策略的得益增加,从而抑制农民“搭便车”的机会主义行为、激励农民积极参与小农水管护的合作行为,并最终促使小农水管护场域中农民进化博弈合作均衡的实现。这一结论的政策启示是:要促使农民积极参与小农水管护,就要加大农村意识形态投入力度以培育声誉资本、激活声誉机制;创新和完善“一事一议”财政奖补政策并使其成为惠及小农水管护场域的有效制度安排。
Under the natural state, the evolutionary game of the peasant farm management field results in the peasant trapped in the prisoner’s dilemma. Institutional embeddedness will make peasants choose to reduce the benefits of “free riding” strategy and increase the benefits of their participation in management and protection strategies, thus inhibiting opportunistic behavior of peasants and encouraging peasants to actively participate in smallholder water management and protection And finally promote the realization of a balanced cooperation in the peasant evolutionary game in the field of smallholder water management. The policy enlightenment of this conclusion is: To encourage farmers to actively participate in smallholder water management, rural ideological input should be intensified to foster reputation capital and activate the reputation mechanism; innovation and improvement And make it an effective institutional arrangement that benefits small-scale peasant farms.