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行政管理支出具有双重属性:过多的支出不利于经济增长,使地方政府及官员在竞争中处于劣势而不利于晋升,同时有违中央政府的宏观政策目标;但能提高地方政府官员个人的经济福利水平。所以在中国财政分权的制度环境下,地方政府对行政管理支出存在两难选择。本文利用我国30个省(自治区、直辖市)1998—2006年的面板数据对财政分权与行政管理支出的关系进行实证研究和稳健性检验。主要结论是:财政分权和行政人员规模是导致地方政府行政管理支出高速增长的两个重要因素,而且前者影响的“经济显著性”水平远大于后者。地区经济发展水平、资源禀赋、社会结构等因素对行政管理支出也有显著性影响。在公共财政体制改革的背景下,其他公共财政支出项目(社会保障支出除外)与行政管理支出存在明显的竞争效应。
Expenditure on administration has double attributes: Excessive expenditures are unfavorable to economic growth, which puts local governments and officials at a disadvantage in the competition and is not conducive to promotion. At the same time, it violates the central government’s macro-policy goals. However, it can boost the individual’s economy of local government officials Welfare level. Therefore, under the institutional environment of fiscal decentralization in China, local governments have a dilemma on administrative expenses. This paper uses the panel data of 30 provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) in China from 1998 to 2006 to test the relationship between fiscal decentralization and administrative expenditure. The main conclusion is that the fiscal decentralization and the size of the administrative staff are the two important factors leading to the rapid growth of the administrative expenditure of the local government, and the level of “economic significance ” affected by the former is much higher than the latter. Regional economic development level, resource endowments, social structure and other factors also have a significant impact on administrative expenses. In the context of the reform of the public finance system, there is a clear competitive effect of other public finance expenditures (except for social security expenditures) and administrative expenditures.