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在政府主导的生态建设工程中,各利益主体决策行为相互影响,策略相互依存。使用博弈论方法研究生态建设工程中利益主体间相互作用关系及结果是一条可行途径。以典型的生态建设工程——退耕还林还草工程为例,分别从静态和动态两方面,建立退耕还林还草博弈模型。模型表明:在中央政府参与的三方动态博弈中,中央政府应当在发展水平较低、生态环境脆弱地区安排下达较多的任务量,同时为保证项目工程顺利实施,应提高该地区的补助比例;在没有中央政府的监督考核机制、群众完成项目量不影响地方政府外部效应情况下,地方政府就会忽视群众利益;农牧民作为项目具体执行者,主要从政府补助比例、工程任务量及自身实际情况出发,考虑完成任务比例,而极少关注政府“信誉”问题。因此,在推进生态建设工程中,项目决策管理层应认识到地区间差异,实行有区别的项目政策,中央政府应在工程中起主导作用。
In the government-led ecological construction project, the decision-making behaviors of various stakeholders influence each other and the strategies are interdependent. It is a feasible way to use the game theory to study the relationship between stakeholders and results in ecological construction projects. Take the typical project of ecological construction-returning farmland to forest and grassland project as an example, the game model of returning farmland to forestry and grassland is set up from both static and dynamic aspects. The model shows that in the three-party dynamic game involving the central government, the central government should arrange more tasks in areas with lower development level and ecologically fragile areas. At the same time, in order to ensure the smooth implementation of the project, the proportion of subsidies should be raised. Without the supervision and appraisal mechanism of the central government and the mass of the project completed by the masses, the local government will ignore the interests of the masses. As the specific executor of the project, the farmers and herdsmen, mainly from the proportion of government subsidies, the amount of construction tasks and their own The actual situation, consider the proportion of the completion of the task, but seldom concerned about the government “credibility ” issue. Therefore, in promoting eco-construction projects, project decision-making management should recognize the differences between regions and implement differentiated project policies. The central government should play a leading role in the project.