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从东道国与外商投资者的博弈行为出发,构建了一个用于分析外资优惠政策调整的动态博弈模型,据此模型得到三个命题:东道国引资过程满足边际收益等于边际成本条件,优惠政策的边界条件取决于收益系数、成本系数以及最佳外资规模的大小;优惠政策与投资环境具有反向的替代关系,与外资的最佳规模呈正比关系;低质量的投资对环境的敏感系数要小于高质量投资,低质量的投资对优惠政策的敏感系数要大于高质量投资。并用这三个命题对中国外资政策调整的历程做了解释。
Based on the game behavior of host countries and foreign investors, a dynamic game model for analyzing the adjustment of foreign preferential policies is constructed. According to this model, three propositions are obtained: the host country’s investment process satisfies the marginal revenue equal to the marginal cost, and the boundary conditions of preferential policies Depends on the income coefficient, the cost coefficient and the size of the optimal foreign investment. The preferential policies have an inverse substitution relationship with the investment environment, which is directly proportional to the optimal scale of foreign investment. The sensitivity of low-quality investment to the environment is less than the high-quality The sensitivity coefficient of investment and low-quality investment to preferential policies is greater than that of high-quality investment. And use these three propositions to explain the course of China’s foreign investment policy adjustment.