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当前,渠道冲突已经成为企业营销渠道关系的一种普遍现象,严重阻碍我国经济的发展。本文通过构造完全信息与不完全信息渠道成员博弈模型,指出无论信息完全程度,双方不合作均是最终的纳什均衡,但却是“囚徒困境”式低效率均衡,易引发渠道冲突;双方合作是帕累托最优状态,渠道冲突消失,社会经济达到最优化;渠道冲突是本阶段博弈的帕累托改进,表现为一方合作而另一方背叛,但却非常地不稳定。进一步研究发现,渠道信息沟通对减少渠道冲突并不都有作用,因此提出共赢信息沟通和共享信息沟通的概念,指出共赢信息沟通能有效地减少渠道冲突,共享信息沟通则非常利于双方做出正确的产品决策,但对减少渠道冲突没有任何作用。最后,为解决渠道成员之间的低效率均衡,引入双方约束机制,指出其与构建无限次重复博弈是引致双方博弈最终均衡达到帕累托最优的两个主要路径。
At present, the channel conflict has become a common phenomenon in the marketing channels of enterprises, which seriously hinders the economic development of our country. This paper constructs a game model of members with complete information and incomplete information, and points out that no matter the complete degree of information and the non-cooperation between the two parties are the final Nash equilibrium, they are inefficient equilibrium of “Prisoners’ Dilemma” Cooperation is Pareto optimality, channel conflict disappears, and social economy reaches the optimum. Channel conflict is the Pareto improvement of the game in this stage, showing one side cooperation and the other side betrayal, but it is very unstable. Further study found that channel information communication did not play a role in reducing channel conflict. Therefore, this paper proposed the concept of mutual information win-win communication and shared information communication, pointed out that communication of win-win information can effectively reduce channel conflict, and sharing information communication is very beneficial to both parties Correct product decisions, but have no effect on reducing channel conflicts. Finally, in order to solve the inefficient equilibrium between channel members, we introduce the restraint mechanism of both parties, and point out that it is the two main paths leading to the Pareto optimal equilibrium between the game and the construction of infinitely repeated games.