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本文运用2008—2012年的盈利预测数据,使用面板数据似无关联立方程模型,实证检验了我国上市公司自愿性盈利预测信息的相关质量特征与审计费用之间的关系。研究证实了“审计验证”假设,即审计对盈利预测信息向市场发送信号的甄别及真实性确认作用。实证结果验证了以下交互过程:盈利预测质量较高的公司,其审计费用也相对较高;同时愿意花更多费用进行审计的上市公司,其盈利预测的准确度等自愿披露信息质量也相对更高。
In this paper, using the EPS data of 2008-2012 and panel data as irrelevant equations, this paper empirically tests the relationship between the quality characteristics of voluntary earnings forecast and the audit fees of listed companies in our country. The study confirms the “audit verification” hypothesis, that is, the audit verifies the screening and authenticity of the profit forecast information to the market. The empirical results verify the following interactive process: companies with higher earnings forecasts have relatively higher audit costs; and those listed companies willing to spend more on audits also have relatively more voluntarily disclosed information, such as the accuracy of their earnings forecasts high.