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基于2006～2011年股权增发样本的实证研究发现,我国上市公司在设计股权增发路径时主要是在公开增发和定向增发之间进行选择,定向增发中投资者的差异并没有构成新的增发路径。信息不对称程度越强,上市公司选择定向增发的可能性越大,而监督效应因素的影响并不显著。在信息不对称情景下,公开增发公司会聘请资本实力更强的承销商来见证公司价值,而资本实力较弱的承销商出于包销风险的考虑,也会影响上市公司股权增发路径的选择。
Based on the empirical study of 2006-2009 equity sample, we find that the listed companies in our country mainly choose between private placement and private placement, while the difference of investors in private placement does not constitute a new additional route. The stronger the information asymmetry, the more likely the listed company will be to private placement, and the influence of the monitoring effect is not significant. In the information asymmetry scenario, the public issuers will hire more underprivileged underwriters to testify the value of the company. However, the underwriter with weak capital strength will also affect the choice of the path for the issuance of equity in listed companies.